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Abstract
An obfuscator is an algorithm that translates circuits into functionally-equivalent similarly-
sized circuits that are hard to understand. Efficient obfuscators would have many applications
in cryptography. Until recently, theoretical progress has mainly been limited to no-go results.
Recent works have proposed the first efficient obfuscation algorithms for classical logic circuits,
based on a notion of indistinguishability against polynomial-time adversaries. In this work,
we propose a new notion of obfuscation, which we call partial-indistinguishability. This no-
tion is based on computationally universal groups with efficiently computable normal forms,
and appears to be incomparable with existing definitions. We describe universal gate sets for
both classical and quantum computation, in which our definition of obfuscation can be met
by polynomial-time algorithms. We also discuss some potential applications to testing quan-
tum computers. We stress that the cryptographic security of these obfuscators, especially when
composed with translation from other gate sets, remains an open question.
1 Introduction
1.1 Past work on circuit obfuscation
Informally, an obfuscator is an algorithm that accepts a circuit as input, and outputs a hard-to-
understand but functionally equivalent circuit. In this subsection, we briefly outline the state of
current research in classical circuit obfuscation. To our knowledge, quantum circuit obfuscation
has not been considered in any prior published work.
Methods used for obfuscating logic circuits in practice have so far been essentially ad hoc [11, 41].
Until recently, theoretical progress has primarily been in the form of no-go theorems for various
strong notions of obfuscation [7, 21]. The ability to efficiently obfuscate certain circuits would have
important applications in cryptography. For instance, sufficiently strong obfuscation of circuits of
the form “encrypt with a hard-wired private key” could turn a private-key encryption scheme into
a public-key encryption scheme. As this example illustrates, one undesirable outcome is when the
input circuit can be recovered completely from the obfuscated circuit. In this case, we say that the
obfuscator completely failed on that circuit [7]. Unfortunately, every obfuscator will completely fail
on some circuits (e.g., learnable circuits.) On the other hand, there are trivial obfuscators which
will erase at least some information from some circuits, e.g., by removing all instances of X−1X
for some invertible gate X.
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In order to give a useful formal definition of obfuscation, one must decide on a reasonable
definition of “hard-to-understand.” The most stringent definition in the literature demands black-
box obfuscation, i.e., that the output circuit is computationally no more useful than a black box
that computes the same function. Barak et al. [8] gave an explicit family of circuits that are
not learnable and yet cannot be black-box obfuscated. They also showed that there exist (non-
learnable) private-key encryption schemes that cannot be turned into a public-key cryptosystem
by obfuscation. Their results do not preclude the possibility of black-box obfuscation for specific
families of circuits, or of applying obfuscation to produce public-key systems from private ones in a
non-generic fashion. It is an open problem whether quantum circuits can be black-box obfuscated.
A weaker but still quite natural notion is called best-possible obfuscation; in this case, we ask
that the obfuscated circuit reveals no more information than any other circuit that computes the
same function. Goldwasser and Rothblum [21] showed that for efficient obfuscators, best-possible
obfuscation is equivalent to indistinguishability obfuscation, which is defined as follows. For any
circuit C, let |C| be the number of elementary gates, and let fC be the Boolean function that C
computes.
Definition 1. A probabilistic algorithm O is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the collection
C of circuits if the following three conditions hold:
1. (functional equivalence) for every C ∈ C, fO(C) = fC ;
2. (polynomial slowdown) there is a polynomial p such that |O(C)| ≤ p(|C|) for every C ∈ C;
3. (indistinguishability obfuscation) For any C1, C2 ∈ C such that fC1 = fC2 and |C1| = |C2|,
the two distributions O(C1) and O(C2) are indistinguishable.
In the third part of the above definition, one must choose a notion of indistinguishability for
probability distributions. Goldwasser and Rothblum [21] consider three such notions: perfect
(exact equality), statistical (total variation distance bounded by a constant), and computational (no
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Machine can distinguish samples with better than negligible
probability). They show that the existence of an efficient statistical indistinguishability obfuscator
would result in a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy to the second level. This result also applies
if the condition |C1| = |C2| in property (3) of Definition 1 is relaxed to |C1| = k|C2| for any fixed
constant k [21].
A recent breakthrough has shown that computational indistinguishability may be achievable
in polynomial time. Combining a new obfuscation scheme for NC1 circuits with fully homomor-
phic encryption, Sahai et al. gave an efficient obfuscator which achieves the computational indis-
tinguishability condition under plausible hardness conjectures [19]. Subsequent work outlined a
number of cryptographic applications of computational indistinguishability [38].
1.2 Outline of present work
1.2.1 New notion of obfuscation
An exact deterministic indistinguishability obfuscator would yield a solution to the circuit equiva-
lence problem. For general Boolean circuits, this problem is co-NP hard. Therefore, exact determin-
istic indistinguishability obfuscation of general Boolean circuits cannot be achieved in polynomial
time under the assumption P 6= NP. We propose an alternative route to weakening the exactness
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condition, by pursuing a notion of “partial-indistinguishability”. In partial-indistinguishability ob-
fuscation, we relax condition (3) so that it need only hold for C1 and C2 that are related by some
fixed, finite set of relations on the underlying gate set.1
Definition 2. Let G be a set of gates and Γ a set of relations satisfied by the elements of G. An
algorithm O is a (G,Γ)-indistinguishability obfuscator for the collection C of circuits over G if the
following three conditions hold:
1. (functionality) for every C ∈ C, fC = fO(C);
2. (polynomial slowdown) there is a polynomial p such that |O(C)| ≤ p(|C|) for every C ∈ C;
3. ((G,Γ)-indistinguishability) for any C1, C2 ∈ C that differ by some sequence of applications
of the relations in Γ, O(C1) = O(C2).
The power of the obfuscation is now determined by the power of the relations Γ. If Γ is a com-
plete set of relations, generating all circuit equivalences over G, then a (G,Γ)-indistinguishability
obfuscator is a perfect indistinguishability obfuscator according to Definition 1. (Complete sets
of relations for {Toffoli} and {AND,OR,NOT} are given in [27, 26].) If Γ is the empty set
then even the identity map fits the definition, and no obfuscation is taking place. With differ-
ent sets of relations, one can interpolate between these extremes. The intermediate obfuscators
form a partially ordered set, where a (G,Γ′)-indistinguishability obfuscator is strictly stronger
than a (G,Γ)-indistinguishability obfuscator if Γ′ is a strict superset of Γ. We remark that partial-
indistinguishability is no stronger than perfect indistinguishability, and appears to be incomparable
with statistical and computational indistinguishability. This is part of our motivation in considering
this new definition.
In the context of quantum computation, we make only a few minor changes to Definitions 1
and 2. First, the obfuscators will still be classical algorithms. On the other hand, the gates will
be unitary and the circuits to be obfuscated will be unitary quantum circuits. Finally, the notion
of functional equivalence now simply means that the operator-norm distance between the unitary
implemented by C and the unitary implemented by O(C) is bounded by a small constant  > 0.
1.2.2 Group normal forms
A finitely generated group can be specified by a presentation. This is a list of generators σ1, . . . , σn
and a list of relations obeyed by these generators. (A relation is simply an identity such as σ1σ3 =
σ3σ1.) All group elements are obtained as products of the generators and their inverses. However, by
applying the relations, we can get multiple words in the generators and their inverses that encode the
same group element. A normal form specifies, for each group element, a unique decomposition as a
product of generators and their inverses. For certain groups, including the braid groups, polynomial
time algorithms are known which, given a product of generators and their inverses, can reduce it
to a normal form. The word problem is, given two words in the alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn, σ−11 , . . . , σn},
to decide whether they specify the same group element. If a normal form can be computed, then
this solves the word problem: just reduce both words to normal form and check whether the results
are identical. However, an efficient solution for the word problem does not in general imply an
efficiently computable normal form.
1Our construction for satisfying this definition uses reversible gates. The definition of functional equivalence
becomes more technical in that context, as discussed in Section 3.1.
3
1.2.3 Efficient constructions from group representations
In this paper, we propose a general method of designing partial-indistinguishability obfuscators
based on groups with efficiently computable normal forms. If a set of gates G obeys the relations
Γ of the generators of a group with an efficiently computable normal form, then the reduction to
normal form is an efficient (G,Γ)-indistinguishability obfuscator. The gates may obey additional
relations beyond Γ, which is why the obfuscator does not solve the circuit-equivalence problem,
which is believed to be intractable for both classical and quantum circuits.
To demonstrate this method, we discuss an implementation using the braid groups Bn, for both
classical reversible circuits and unitary quantum circuits. The number of strands n in the braid
group depends linearly on the number of dits or qudits on which the circuit acts. In Section 3,
we describe a computationally universal reversible classical gate obeying the braid group relations,
which was constructed in [34, 37, 31] from the quantum double of A5. In Section 4.1, we describe a
computationally universal quantum gate obeying the braid group relations, which was constructed
in [18] from the Fibonacci anyons. Our obfuscation scheme is similar in spirit to previously-
proposed obfuscation schemes based on applying local circuit identities [41], but the uniqueness
of normal forms adds a qualitatively new feature. One consequence of this feature is that we can
satisfy Definition 2 and guarantee the partial-indistinguishability property against computationally
unbounded adversaries. The running time of the obfuscator is the same as the running time of the
the normal form algorithms, which take time O(l2m logm) for m-strand braids of length l [14].
We remark that these gate sets that obey the braid group relations are not artificial construc-
tions; in fact, they are the most natural choice in many contexts, some of which we list here. In
the quantum case, these gates are native to certain proposed physical implementations of quantum
computers [31], where the topological braiding property provides inherent fault-tolerance. The
problem of approximating the Jones Polynomial invariant of links is complete for polynomial-time
quantum computation [2]; an analogous fact is true for a restricted case of quantum computations
motivated by NMR implementations [40]. Both of these facts are naturally expressed in the gate
set constructed from the Fibonacci representation. In the classical case, the gate set derived from
quantum doubles of finite groups was recently used to show BPP-completeness for approximation
of certain link invariants [32].
We remark that another potential group family for constructing partial-indistinguishability ob-
fuscators are the mapping class groups MCG(Σg) of unpunctured surfaces of genus g. These groups
also have quantumly universal representations [5] and an efficiently solvable word problem [23]. It
is not known if there are also classically universal permutation representations, or if there are
efficiently computable normal forms.
1.2.4 Other gate sets
In some applications the native gate set will be different than the ones used in our construction. It
is natural to ask if our obfuscators can be used in these settings as well. By universality (quantum
or classical), one has an efficient algorithm B which translates circuits from the native gate set to
the braiding gate set, as well as an efficient algorithm C for translation in the opposite direction. We
also let N denote the partial-indistinguishability obfuscator. One might then attempt to obfuscate
by applying the following:
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Figure 1: The generator σi represents the (clockwise) crossing of strands i and i+ 1 connecting a
bottom row of “pegs” to a top row. Multiplication of group elements corresponds to composition
of braids. As an example, we show the 3-strand braid σ−11 σ2 (left), and the same braid composed
with its inverse σ−12 σ1 (middle), which is equivalent to the identity element of B3 (right).
Algorithm 1.
1. input: a circuit C on n (qu)dits
2. output: The circuit C(N(B(C))).
We stress that, unlike the map N, the composed map N ◦ B does not necessarily satisfy Def-
inition 2. As we discuss in Section 5.1, careless choice of the map B can partially or completely
break the security of the obfuscator. Finding translation algorithms securely composable with
partial-indistinguishability obfuscators is an area of current investigation.
2 Relevant Properties of the Braid Group
The braid group Bn is the infinite discrete group with generators σ1, . . . , σn−1 and relations
σiσj = σjσi ∀ |i− j| ≥ 2
σiσi+1σi = σi+1σiσi+1 ∀ i. (1)
The group Bn is thus the set of all words in the alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn−1, σ−11 , . . . , σ−1n−1}, up to
equivalence determined by the above relations. In 1925 Artin proved that the abstract group
defined above precisely captures the topological equivalence of braided strings [6], as illustrated in
Fig. 1. A charming exposition of this subject can be found in [30].
In the word problem on Bn, we are given words w and z, and our goal is to determine if they
are equal as elements of Bn. One solution is to put both w and z into a normal form, and then
check if they are equal as words. For our purposes, it is enough to describe the normal form and
specify the complexity of the algorithm for computing it. The details of the algorithm, along with
a thorough and accessible presentation of the relevant facts about braids, can be found in [14].
We first observe that the word problem is easily shown to be decidable if we restrict our attention
to an important subset of Bn. Note that the presentation (1) can also be viewed as a presentation
of a monoid, which we denote by B+n . The elements of B
+
n are called positive braids, and are words
in the generators σi only (no inverses), up to equivalence determined by the relations in (1). Since
all the relations of Bn preserve word length, and there are only finitely many words of any given
length, we can decide the word problem (albeit very inefficiently) simply by trying all possible
combinations of the relations.
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Building upon this, one can give an (inefficient) algorithm for the word problem on Bn itself [22].
First, given two elements a, b of B+n , we write a 4 b if there exists z ∈ B+n such that b = az; in
this case we say that a is a left divisor of b. Similarly, we write a < b if there exists y ∈ B+n such
that b = ya; in this case we say that a is a right divisor2 of b. The center of Bn is the cyclic group
generated by ∆2n, where
∆n := ∆n−1σn−1σn−2 · · ·σ1 ∈ B+n
(see p.30 of [22] for a simple proof). Geometrically, ∆n implements a twist by pi in the z-plane
as the strands move from z = 0 to z = 1. One can show that σi 4 ∆n for all i, i.e. there exists
xi ∈ B+n such that σ−1i = xi∆−1n . Given a word w in the σi and their inverses, we first replace
the leftmost instance of an inverse generator (say it is σ−1i ) with xi∆
−1
n . We then insert ∆
−1
n ∆n
in front of xi, and observe that conjugating a positive braid x by ∆n results in another positive
braid (specifically, the rotation of x by pi in the z-plane). In this way, we can push ∆−1n all the
way to the left. We repeat this process for each inverse generator appearing in the word, resulting
in a word of the form ∆pnb where p ∈ Z and b ∈ B+n . Since we can solve the word problem in B+n ,
we can factor out the maximal power of ∆n appearing as a left divisor of b. We thus have that, as
elements of the braid group, w = ∆p
′
n b′ with ∆n not a left divisor of b′ and p′ unique. This solves
the word problem in Bn.
We can make the above algorithm efficient by finding an efficiently computable normal form for
a positive braid word b that does not have ∆n as a left divisor. Recall that the symmetric group
Sn has a remarkably similar presentation to Bn. Indeed, starting with (1), letting σi = (i i + 1)
and adding the relations σ2i = 1 for all i results in the standard presentation of Sn. In other words,
there is a surjective homomorphism pi : Bn → Sn with σi 7→ (i i + 1). In terms of the geometric
interpretation, a braid is mapped to the permutation on [n] defined by the connections between the
top and bottom “pegs,” as in Figure 1. For each σ ∈ Sn, there is a unique preimage of σ that can
be drawn so that any given pair of strands cross only in the positive direction, and at most once.
We call such braids simple braids, and they form a subset of B+n of size n!.
Definition 3. p.4 of [14].
1. A sequence of simple braids (s1, . . . , sp) is said to be normal if, for each j, every σi that is a
left divisor of sj+1 is a right divisor of sj.
2. A sequence of permutations (f1, . . . , fp) is said to be normal if, for each j, f
−1
j+1(i) > f
−1
j+1(i+1)
implies fj(i) > fj(i+ 1).
A sequence of simple braids (s1, . . . , sp) is normal if and only if the sequence of permutations
(pi(s1), . . . , pi(sp)) is normal. Given a permutation f ∈ Sn, let fˆ denote the simple braid of Bn
satisfying pi(fˆ) = f .
Theorem 1. p.4 of [14] and Ch.9 of [15].
1. Every braid z in Bn admits a unique decomposition of the form ∆
m
n s1 . . . sp with m ∈ Z and
(s1, . . . , sp) a normal sequence of simple braids satisfying s1 6= ∆n and sp 6= 1.
2. Every braid z in Bn admits a unique decomposition of the form ∆
m
n fˆ1 . . . fˆp with m ∈ Z and
(f1, . . . , fp) a normal sequence of permutations satisfying f1 6= pi(∆n) and fp 6= 1.
2The terminology is not accidental; it turns out that we can also define l.c.m.s and g.c.d.s in B+n , and that Bn is
the group of fractions of B+n . These facts are some of the achievements of Garside theory [20].
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The most efficient algorithms for computing the normal form of a word w in the generators of Bn
have complexity O(|w|2n log n) [14].
3 Obfuscation of Classical Reversible Circuits
3.1 Reversible Circuits
In the next section, we will describe a gate R which is universal for classical computation and
satisfies Definition 2 when Γ is the set of relations of the braid group. Because group elements
are invertible, R must be a reversible gate, that is, it must bijectively map its possible inputs
to its possible outputs. We will thus work in the setting of reversible classical circuits. These
circuits are composed entirely of reversible gates. For more background on reversible computation
see [9, 17, 36].
Because reversible circuits cannot erase any information, they operate using ancillary dits (“an-
cillas”) to store unerasable data left over from intermediate steps in the computation. A reversible
circuit evaluating a function f : {0, . . . , d− 1}n → {0, . . . , d− 1}m thus operates on r ≥ max(n,m)
dits, where r−n of the input dits are work dits to be initialized to some fixed value independent of
the problem instance, and r−m of the output dits contain unerasable leftover data, to be ignored.
Efficient procedures are known for compiling arbitrary logic circuits into reversible form, e.g., by
using the Toffoli (or CCNOT) gate [9, 17].
In adapting Definitions 1 and 2 to reversible circuits, one is faced with two natural choices for the
notion of functional equivalence. One may either demand that the original and obfuscated circuits
implement the same function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, ignoring the ancilla dits (weak equivalence), or
demand that they implement the same transformation on the entire set of r dits, including the ancil-
las (strong equivalence). Our constructions will satisfy the latter. Strong equivalence implies weak
equivalence, so our construction proves that both possible definitions of partial-indistinguishability
are polynomial-time achievable when Γ is the set of relations of the braid group. We remark that,
as with ordinary irreversible circuits, determining if two arbitrary reversible circuits are equivalent
(weakly or strongly) is coNP-complete [29].
3.2 Classical computation with braids
We now briefly describe a classical reversible gateR which satisfies the braid relations. The complete
details of the construction and the proof of universality of R are given in Appendix A. Taken
together with Theorem 1, this yields an obfuscator satisfying Definition 2.
Let G be a finite group and set d = |G|. Consider the reversible gate R that acts on pairs of
dits encoding group elements by
R(a, b) = (b, b−1ab). (2)
Let Ri denote R acting on the i and (i + 1)
th wires of a circuit. By direct calculation, one can
check that the set {R1, . . . , Rn−1} satisfies the braid relations, that is,
RiRj = RjRi ∀ |i− j| ≥ 2
RiRi+1Ri = Ri+1RiRi+1 ∀ i. (3)
In 1997, Kitaev discovered that the gate set {R,R−1} is universal for classical reversible compu-
tation when G is the symmetric group S5 [31]. Ogburn and Preskill subsequently showed that
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the alternating group A5, which is half as large as S5, is already sufficient [37]. The universality
construction for A5 was subsequently presented in greater detail and generalized to all non-solvable
groups by Mochon [34]. To make our presentation more accessible and self-contained, we give in
Appendix A an explicit description of Mochon’s universality construction in the the case G = A5.
The construction proves computational universality by showing how to efficiently compile Toffoli
circuits into R-circuits.
Given any R-circuit, we can apply the algorithm of Theorem 1 by interpreting each Ri as σi and
each R−1i as σ
−1
i . This leads to partial-indistinguishability obfuscation of R-circuits. A discussion
of whether this can also yield meaningful obfuscation for classical circuits constructed from other
gate sets is given in Section 5.
4 Quantum Circuits
4.1 Quantum computation with braids
In Section 3.2 and Appendix A, we discuss classical universality of circuits encoded as braids. It
turns out that an analogous theory can be developed for quantum circuits, and is well-understood.
The family of so-called Fibonacci representations of the braid groups have dense image in the
unitary group, and there are efficient classical algorithms for translating any quantum circuit into
a braid (and vice-versa) in a way that preserves unitary functionality [18]. A brief synopsis of these
facts is given below. We remark that there are in fact many unitary representations of the braid
groups that satisfy these properties, and which are physically motivated by the so-called fractional
quantum Hall effect. In this setting, the image of these representations consists of unitary operators
which describe the braiding of excitations in a 2-dimensional medium [31].
Approachable descriptions of the Fibonacci representation are given in [40, 42]. In [40], what
we call the “Fibonacci representation” here, is called the “??” irreducible sub-representation. This
is a family of representations ρ
(n)
Fib : Bn → U(Fn−4), where Fk is the k-th Fibonacci number. For our
application, the essential properties of the Fibonacci representation are locality and local density.
These two properties mean that, under a certain qubit encoding, braid generators correspond to
local unitaries, and local unitaries correspond to short braid words. Standard arguments from
quantum computation tell us that we can achieve the latter to precision  with O(log2.71(1/))
braid generators by means of the Solovay-Kitaev algorithm [13].
A natural basis for the space of ρ
(n)
Fib can be identified with strings of length n from the alphabet
{?, p}, which begin with ?, end with p, and do not contain “??” as a substring3. Following [2]4,
for n a multiple of four, we identify a particular subspace Vn of ρ
(n)
Fib by discarding some basis
elements, as follows. Partition a string s into substrings of length four. If each of these substrings
is equal to either ?p ? p (this will encode a 0) or ?ppp (this will encode a 1), then the basis element
corresponding to s is in Vn; otherwise, it is not. Note that dimVn = 2
n/4. The following theorem
follows from [2, 13].
3In [40] the ?? subrepresentation of Bn acts on strings of length n + 1 that begin and end with ?. One can leave
the initial and/or final ? implicit as these are left unchanged by all braiding operations. We omit the final ? leaving
us strings of length n that begin with ? and end with p.
4Reference [2] describes the basis vectors in terms of “paths”. The correspondence between the path notation and
the p? notation is given in appendix C of [40].
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Theorem 2. There is a classical algorithm which, given an (n/4)-qubit quantum circuit C and
 > 0, outputs a braid b ∈ Bn of length O(|C| log2.71(1/)) satisfying∥∥∥∥C − ρ(n)Fib(b)∣∣∣Vn
∥∥∥∥ ≤  ;
this algorithm has complexity O(|b|).
For the opposite direction, we can identify a subspace Wn ⊂ (C2)⊗n by discarding all bitstrings
except those that start with 0, end with 1 and do not have “00” as a substring. Then dimWn =
dim ρ
(n)
Fib and we have the following.
Theorem 3. There is a classical algorithm which, given b ∈ Bn and  > 0, outputs a quantum
circuit C on n qubits of length O(|b| log2.71(1/)) such that∥∥∥C|Wn − ρ(n)Fib(b)∥∥∥ ≤  ;
this algorithm has complexity O(|C|).
The two algorithms in the above theorems are described explicitly in [2].
4.2 Obfuscating quantum computations
While the state of knowledge about classical obfuscation is limited, essentially nothing is known
about the quantum case. Here we discuss how to use the facts from the previous section to construct
a partial-indistinguishability obfuscator for quantum circuits.
In light of Theorem 2, {ρFib(σ1), . . . , ρFib(σn−1)} may be regarded as a universal set of elemen-
tary quantum gates. By the homomorphism property of ρFib, this set satisfies the braid relations.
These gates differ from conventional quantum gates in that they do not possess locality defined in
terms of a strict tensor product structure. Nevertheless, as shown above, the power of unitary cir-
cuits composed from these gates is equivalent to standard quantum computation. By interpreting
each ρFib(σj) as a braid-group generator σj , we can apply the algorithm from Theorem 1 directly to
circuits from this gate set, resulting in a partial-indistinguishability obfuscator satisfying Definition
2.
With the algorithms from the previous section in hand, we could also attempt to apply the
obfuscation algorithm, Algorithm 1, directly to quantum circuits. For an input circuit C on n
qubits, the running times of both of this algorithm is O(|C|2n · polylog(n, 1/)). The length of the
output cannot be longer than the running time. We are not aware of a better upper bound for
the length of the output. The security of this algorithms is questionable, and some attacks and
possible countermeasures are discussed in Section 5.
Note that reduction of arbitrary quantum circuits to a normal form using a complete set of gate
relations should not be possible in polynomial time; this would yield a polynomial-time algorithm
for deciding whether a quantum circuit is equivalent to the identity, which is a coQMA-complete
problem [28].
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4.3 Testing claimed quantum computers with a quantum obfuscator
It is natural to consider quantum analogues of the applications of obfuscation from classical com-
puter science. We now consider a potential application of quantum circuit obfuscation that does
not fit this mold: testing claimed quantum computers. A similar proposal using a restricted class
of quantum circuits has been previously made in [39].
Suppose Bob claims to have access to a universal quantum computer with some fixed finite
number of qubits. Alice has access to a classical computer only, as well as a classical communication
channel with Bob. Can Alice determine if Bob is telling the truth? Barring tremendous advances
in complexity theory, a provably correct test is unlikely;5 can we still design a test in which we
have a high degree of confidence? Given the extensive work on classical algorithms for factoring,
a reasonable idea is to simply ask Bob to factor a sufficiently large RSA number. However, Shor’s
algorithm only begins to outperform the best classical algorithms when thousands of logical qubits
can be employed. A much smaller universal quantum computer (e.g., a few dozen qubits) is likely
to be a far simpler engineering challenge and could still be quite useful, e.g., for simulating certain
quantum systems. A test that works in this case would thus be very valuable. We now outline
a new proposal for such a test. Simply put, we propose asking questions that are classically
easy to answer, but posing them in an obfuscated manner. In this test, Alice would repeatedly
generate quantum circuits and ask Bob to run them. At least some of the circuits would in fact
be quantumly-obfuscated classical reversible circuits, allowing Alice to easily check the answers.
Previous work has yielded tests of quantum computers in the case that the verifier can perform
some limited quantum operations [10, 3].
We have considerable freedom when designing an obfuscation-based test of quantum computers.
How to choose these parameters in a way that makes the test difficult to fool with a classical
computer is an open question. For purposes of illustration, we give one example. Let O be the
obfuscation algorithm for quantum circuits described above.
Algorithm 2.
1. Select a random bitstring s of length k.
2. Let C be the (k + 1)-bit circuit that, on all-zero input, initializes wires 2 through k + 1 to s
and then computes the parity of s into the first wire.
3. Compute O(C), and let n be the number of qubits needed to run O(C).
4. Ask Bob to run D on the all zeros string and return the first bit of output.
Clearly, k must be chosen so that n is smaller than the number of logical qubits Bob claims to
control. To fool Alice, a purely classical Bob must determine the parity of s. The dictionary attack
(i.e. Bob repeatedly guesses at k, obfuscates the corresponding circuit, and compares the result to
the circuit given by Alice) is of no use provided k is reasonably large, e.g., 80 bits, which can be
encoded using a braid of 115 strands using the Zeckendorf encoding described in [40].
We now show that there can be no efficient general-purpose algorithm for breaking our test by
detecting whether a given quantum circuit is in fact (almost) classical, and if so, simulating it.
5Notice that even a proof that BQP 6= BPP would be insufficient; one would have to find specific problems and
instance sizes where some quantum strategy provably beats every classical one. We are thus left with a situation
analogous to the practical security guarantees of modern cryptographic systems, which tell us how many bit operations
it would take to crack a given instance using the fastest known algorithms.
10
Definition 4. Let c be a bit string specifying a quantum circuit via a standard universal set Q of
quantum gates, and let Uc be the corresponding unitary operator. Fix some constants r, d, a ∈ N,
and fix a set R of reversible gates. The problem CLASS(r, d, a,Q,R) is to find a reversible circuit of
at most r|c|d gates from R such that the corresponding permutation matrix P satisfies ‖Uc − P‖ ≤
2−a|c|.
Note that CLASS(r, d, a,Q,R) is not a decision problem. Thus, to formulate the question of whether
this problem can be efficiently solved, we must ask not whether CLASS(r, d, a,Q,R) is contained
in P but whether it is contained in FP. We now provide some formal evidence that this is not the
case. Note that the following theorems continue to hold if we change the classicality condition in
Definition 4 to ‖Uc − P‖ ≤ |c|−a.
Theorem 4. For any fixed r, d, a ∈ N, any universal reversible gate set R, and any universal
quantum gate set Q, if CLASS(r, d, a,Q,R) ∈ FP then QCMA ⊆ PNP.
Note that, QCMA ⊆ PNP would be very surprising because, among other things, it would imply
BQP ⊆ PH, and there is evidence that this is false [1, 16].
Proof. The standard QCMA-complete language L is as follows. Let C be the set of all quantum
circuits (expressed as a concatenation of bitstrings that index elements of the gate set Q). C
decomposes as the disjoint union of L and L¯ where L consists of the quantum circuits that accept
at least one classical (i.e. computational basis state) input, and L¯ consists of the circuits that
reject all inputs. Given a quantum circuit V1 ∈ C, (the “verifier”) we can amplify it using standard
techniques [33, 35] to accept YES instances with probability at least 1 − O(2−n) and accept NO
instances with probability at most O(2−n). Let V2 be such an amplified verifier. Further, let
V3 =
V2
•
V −12
where the second-to-top qubit is the acceptance qubit of V2. If Vi ∈ L¯ then ‖V3 − 1‖ = O(2−n).
By assumption, there exists a polynomial time classical algorithm for solving CLASS(r, d, a,Q,R).
When presented with V3, this algorithm will produce a polynomial-size reversible circuit V4 strongly
equivalent to the identity. By querying an oracle for the problem of strong equivalence of reversible
circuits, one can decide whether V4 is equivalent to the circuit of no gates, and hence to the identity
operation. If V1 ∈ L¯, this oracle will accept. If V1 ∈ L then the algorithm for problem 1 will answer
NO or produce a circuit that this oracle rejects. As shown in [29], the problem of deciding strong
equivalence of reversible circuits is contained in coNP. Thus, we can decide QCMA in PcoNP, which
is equal to the more familiar complexity class PNP.
5 Some Attacks
5.1 Compiler attacks
The security or insecurity of braid-based partial-indistinguishability obfuscation remains an area
of current investigation. From a purely information-theoretic point of view, the power of this
obfuscation comes from the many-to-one nature of the map N that takes arbitrary braid words to
their normal form. If the initial braid words are highly structured because they are obtained by
11
compilation from a different gate set, then this can undermine or destroy the many-to-one feature
of N.
In Section 3.2, we describe a reversible gate R on pairs of 60-state dits, corresponding to
elements of A5, that obeys the relations of the braid group and can perform universal classical
computation. The gate itself and the proof that it is universal come from the quantum computation
literature [31, 37, 34]. Appendix A recounts the universality proof of [34], which can be viewed as
a compiler BR that maps circuits constructed from the well-known universal reversible Toffoli gate
into circuits constructed from the R gate. As a cautionary example, we now show that naively
obfuscating Toffoli circuits using the composed map N ◦ BR is completely insecure.
The construction in Appendix A gives a general mapping from a Toffoli gate to a corresponding
braid. We will refer to braids obtained in this way as Toffoli braids. Recall that the normal form
of a braid in Bn has the form ∆
m
n s1 . . . sp for a normal sequence of simple braids (s1, . . . , sp). A
Toffoli braid obtained from a Toffoli with controls c1 and c2 and target t has normal form
∆0ns1(c1, c2, t)s2s3s4s5s6s7s8s9(c1, c2, t)s10s11s12s13(c1, c2, t)s14(t). (4)
The factors s2, . . . , s8, s10, s11 and s12 only depend on n, and not on the wires c1, c2 or t. Note that
this is a positive braid — consisting only of σ1, . . . , σn−1 and none of their inverses. Any product of
such braids will thus also be a positive braid, so attempting to obfuscate a circuit in Toffoli gates
using this construction will yield only positive braids.
Because Toffoli is a 3-bit gate, there are only
(
n
3
)
ways to apply a Toffoli to n bits. Thus, one may,
in polynomial time, test each of these
(
n
3
)
possibilities as a guess for the last gate of the obfuscated
circuit. One performs the test by compiling the guessed Toffoli gate into a braid, appending the
inverse of this braid to the normal form braid produced as the output the obfuscator, and then
reducing the resulting braid to normal form. If the guess is correct, then the resulting braid is
still a braid corresponding to a circuit — the original obfuscated circuit with its last Toffoli gate
removed — and thus this will result in a positive braid. If the guess is incorrect, then appending
the inverse of a positive braid, which consists entirely of σ−11 , . . . , σ
−1
n−1, might result in a braid that
is no longer positive — that is, has a negative power of ∆n, and this seems to be the case with any
wrong guess, based on some limited tests. Furthermore, the presence of a negative power of ∆n is
efficiently recognizable, so it is immediately clear whether or not the guess was correct.
This attack is related to so-called length-based attacks. These have been introduced in the
cryptanalysis of braid based key-exchanged protocols [25]. In the present context, the natural
length-based attack is to guess the final gate, append the inverse of the corresponding braid to the
normal-form braid produced by the obfuscator, and the reduce the product braid to normal form.
If the result is a shorter word in the braid-group generators than the original normal form, then
this can be taken as heuristic evidence that the guess was correct. Intuitively, one expects that
the longer the braid words are that implement individual gates from the original gate set, then the
better such attacks should work.
One can easily propose modifications to the naive obfuscator N◦BR that thwart guessing-based
attacks such as the two attacks described above. In particular, one finds that the gate R described
in Appendix A has order 60. Hence, one can start with the positive Toffoli braid in equation (4)
and then each generator σi can independently, with probability
1
2 , be replaced with σ
−59
i , without
altering the functionality of the circuit. The number of generators in a Toffoli braid depends on
n, and which wires the Toffoli acts on, but there are always at least 124. Thus, each gate will be
compiled into one of 2124 braid-words uniformly at random. Thus, guessing-based attacks on the
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composition of this compiler with N may become impractical. Whether such a scheme is vulnerable
to other attacks remains an open question for future research.
5.2 Dictionary attacks
The partial-indistinguishability obfuscator described in the preceding sections deterministically
maps input circuits to obfuscated circuits. This creates a potential weakness in the obfuscation.
Suppose Alice wishes to run a computation C on Bob’s server but does not wish Bob to know what
computation she is running. Thus, she sends the obfuscated circuit O(C) to Bob, who executes
it, and returns the result. To improve security, Alice may instead use a circuit C ′ in which her
desired input is hard-coded, and which applies a one-time pad at the end of the computation. If
the obfuscation is secure, then Bob is unlikely to learn anything about C, the input, or the output.
However, if Bob knows that the circuits Alice is likely to want to execute are drawn from some small
set S, then Bob can simply compute {O(s)|s ∈ S} and identify Alice’s computation by finding it
in this list. Such attacks are sometimes called “dictionary” attacks after the practice of recovering
passwords by feeding all words from a dictionary into the hash function and comparing against the
hashed password.
Dictionary attacks may or may not be a serious threat to our obfuscation scheme, depending
on the the size of the set of likely circuits to be obfuscated. In cryptographic applications where
dictionary attacks are a concern, the standard way to protect against them is to append random
bits prior to encryption. (In the context of hashing passwords, this practice is called “salting”.)
Such a strategy can be applied to our obfuscator, but some care must be taken in doing so. The
most obvious strategy is to append a random circuit on the output ancillas prior to obfuscation.
However, attackers can defeat this countermeasure by using the polynomial-time algorithms for
computing left-greatest-common-divisors in the braid group [15]. However, prior to obfuscation,
one may introduce extra dits, and apply random circuits before, after, and simultaneously with
the computation, in a way so as not to disrupt it. The problem of optimizing the details of this
procedure so as to maximize security and efficiency is left to future work.
6 Future Work
6.1 Classical and quantum universality
It is of interest to consider other computationally universal representations of the braid group, which
might provide more efficient translations from circuits to braids. One avenue for obtaining such
representations is by finding other solutions to the Yang-Baxter equation, besides the operator R
from Appendix A. Our investigations so far prove that no permutation matrix solution of dimension
up to 16 × 16 is a universal gate and suggest that no permutation matrix solution of dimension
25× 25 is a universal gate. In the quantum case, it has been shown that no 4× 4 unitary solution
is universal [4].
More generally, one may look for other finitely-generated groups with computationally universal
representations and efficiently computable normal forms. One potential candidate family are the
mapping class groups MCG(Σg) of unpunctured surfaces of genus g. These groups also have
quantumly universal representations [5] and an efficiently solvable word problem [23]. It is not
known if there are also classically universal permutation representations, or if there are efficiently
computable normal forms.
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6.2 Expanding the set of indistinguishability relations
By [29], achieving efficient indistinguishability obfuscation for the complete set of relations of a
universal gate set is unlikely. However, it is possible that partial-indistinguishability obfuscation
on R gates could be achieved with a larger set of relations than the braid relations. For example,
the universal reversible gate described in Appendix A has order 60. If we add the relations σ60i = 1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 to Bn, we obtain a “truncated” (but still infinite for large n [12]) factor of
the braid group. If a normal form can still be computed in polynomial time for this group then
one could construct an efficient obfuscator using the relations of this truncated group, which would
be strictly stronger than our braid group obfuscator. This approach also provides motivation for
finding a complete set of relations for the gate R.
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A Classical Computation with Braids
In this section, we present a reversible gate R on pairs of 60-state dits that can perform universal
computation and obeys the relations of the braid group. The universality construction for this
gate comes from the quantum computation literature [31, 37, 34], but we present it here in purely
classical language to make it accessible to a broader audience.
Suppose we arrange n dits on a line, and allow R to act only on neighboring dits. Further, we
do not allow R to be applied “upside-down”. Then, there are n − 1 choices for how to apply R.
We label these R1, R2, . . . , Rn−1, as illustrated in Figure 2. Each of R1, . . . , Rn−1 corresponds to a
dn × dn permutation matrix. Specifically, Rj is obtained by taking the tensor product of R with
identity matrices according to Rj = 1
⊗(j−1)
d×d ⊗R⊗ 1⊗(n−j−1)d×d .
R1
R2
R3
Figure 2: An example of a reversible circuit constructed from a single gate R. As a product of
matrices, we write this R2R3R1, in keeping with the convention [36] that circuit diagrams are to
be read left-to-right, whereas the matrix product acts right-to-left. Note that in subsequent circuit
diagrams we drop the subscripts from the R gates as these can be read off from the “wires” the
gates act on.
R1, . . . , Rn−1 generate a subgroup of Sdn . Among others, these generators obey the relations
RiRj = RjRi ∀|i− j| ≥ 2. (5)
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If R satisfies
R1R2R1 = R2R1R2 (6)
then
RiRi+1Ri = Ri+1RiRi+1 ∀i (7)
and in this case the gates R1, . . . , Rn−1 satisfy all the relations of the braid group Bn. In other
words, the map defined by σi 7→ Ri and σ−1i 7→ R−1i is a homomorphism from Bn to Sdn , i.e. a
representation of the braid group. Note that this representation is never faithful as Bn is infinite.
The condition 6 is known as the Yang-Baxter equation6. Finding all the matrices satisfying
the Yang-Baxter equation at a given dimension has only been achieved at d = 2 [24]. However,
certain systematic constructions coming from mathematical physics can produce infinite families of
solutions. In particular, let G be any finite group, and let R be the permutation on the set G×G
defined by
R(a, b) = (b, b−1ab). (8)
By direct calculation one sees that any such an R satisfies the Yang-Baxter equation. (In physics
language, R comes from the braiding statistics of the magnetic fluxes in the quantum double of G.)
In 1997, Kitaev discovered that choosing G to be the symmetric group S5 yields an R gate suf-
ficient to perform universal reversible computation [31]. Ogburn and Preskill subsequently showed
that the alternating group A5, which is half as large as S5, is already sufficient. The universality
construction for A5 was subsequently presented in greater detail and generalized to all non-solvable
groups by Mochon [34]. In the remainder of this section we give a self-contained exposition of the
universality construction from [34], shorn of physics language.
To obtain a representation of the braid group, we must strictly enforce the requirement that
application of R to neighboring dits on a line is the only allowed operation. In particular, we are
not given as elementary operations the ability to apply R upside-down, or to non-neighboring dits,
or to move dits around. Thus, to prove computational universality, it is helpful to first construct
a SWAP gate from R gates, which exchanges neighboring dits. As is well-known, the n− 1 swaps
of nearest neighbors on a line generate the full group Sn of permutations, and thus a SWAP gate
enables application of R to any pair of dits.
For R gates of the form (2), two pairs of inverse group elements in the order a, a−1, b, b−1 can
be swapped by applying the product R2R3R1R2. Thus, in the construction of [37, 34], elements of
A5 are always paired with their inverses. This can be regarded as a form of encoding; |A5| = 60, so
each 60-state dit is encoded by a corresponding pair of elements of A5. We introduce the notation
g˜ ≡ (g, g−1) for this encoding, and similarly, abbreviate the encoded swap operation as follows.
a˜
S
b˜
b˜ a˜
≡
a
R
b
a−1
R R
b−1
b
R
a
b−1 a−1
6Actually, two slightly different equations go by the name Yang-Baxter in the literature. Careful sources distinguish
these as the algebraic Yang-Baxter equation and the braided Yang-Baxter relation (which is sometimes called the
quantum Yang-Baxter equation). Equation 6 is the latter. Furthermore, some sources treat a more complicated
version of the Yang-Baxter equation in which R depends on a continuous parameter. In such works equation 6 is
often referred to as the constant Yang-Baxter equation.
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Similarly, the sequence R2R3R3R2 performs the transformation (a˜, b˜) 7→ (a˜, a˜ba−1) on a pair of
encoded dits. We abbreviate this in circuit diagrams as follows.
a˜ • a˜
b˜ C a˜ba−1
≡
a a
a−1
R R
a−1
b
R R
aba−1
b−1 ab−1a−1
a˜ • a˜
b˜ C−1 a˜−1ba
≡
a a
a−1
R−1 R−1
a−1
b
R−1 R−1
a−1ba
b−1 a−1b−1a
This notation can easily be extended to provide a shorthand for the sequence of gates needed to
implement a C gate between non-neighboring pairs of bits, as illustrated by the following examples.
•
C
≡
•
S
C
S
S S
C
•
≡ S
•
S
C
Next, consider the following product of elements of A5 (which should be read right-to-left).
f(g1, g2) = (521)g1(14352)g2(124)g
−1
1 (15342)g
−1
2 (521) (9)
One sees that
f((345), (345)) = 1
f((345), (435)) = 1
f((435), (345)) = 1
f((435), (435)) = (12)(34)
where 1 denotes the identity permutation. Furthermore, conjugating (345) by (12)(34) yields
(435), and conversely, conjugating (435) by (12)(34) yields (345). Thus, we may think of (345) as
an encoded zero and (435) as an encoded one, and we see that
f(g1, g2)g0f(g1, g2)
−1 (10)
toggles g0 between one and zero if g1 and g2 are both encoded ones and leaves g0 unchanged
otherwise. Such a doubly-controlled toggling operation is known as a Toffoli gate, which is well-
known to be a computationally universal reversible gate [17].
As a circuit diagram, this construction can be expressed as follows.
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˜(14352) • ˜(14352)
˜(15342) • ˜(15342)
(˜124) • (˜124)
(˜521) • • (˜521)
g˜0 C C−1 C C−1 C C C C C g˜′0
g˜1 • • g˜1
g˜2 • • g˜2
Here, if g0, g1, g2 encode bits b0, b1, b2 then g
′
0 encodes b0 ⊕ b1 ∧ b2. The four ancillary dits ˜(14352),
˜(15342), (˜124), and (˜521), are used to “catalytically” facilitate the construction of a Toffoli gate,
and thus computations built from arbitrarily many Toffoli gates can be performed with only one
copy of these four dits.
Unpacking the various shorthand notations, one sees that the above circuit represents the
following braid of 132 crossings on 14 strands, which encodes a Toffoli gate with the first wire
as target, and the second and third wires as controls.
T = σ8σ9σ9σ8 σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ10σ11σ11σ10 σ10σ11σ9σ10
σ2σ3σ1σ2 σ4σ5σ3σ4 σ6σ7σ5σ6 σ8σ9σ9σ8
σ6σ7σ5σ6 σ4σ5σ3σ4 σ2σ3σ1σ2 σ12σ13σ11σ12
σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ10σ11σ11σ10 σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ12σ13σ11σ12
σ6σ7σ5σ6 σ8σ9σ9σ8 σ6σ7σ5σ6 σ10σ11σ9σ10
σ−110 σ
−1
11 σ
−1
11 σ
−1
10 σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ4σ5σ3σ4 σ6σ7σ5σ6
σ8σ9σ9σ8 σ6σ7σ5σ6 σ4σ5σ3σ4 σ12σ13σ11σ12
σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ
−1
10 σ
−1
11 σ
−1
11 σ
−1
10 σ10σ11σ9σ10 σ12σ13σ11σ12
σ8σ9σ9σ8
(11)
Note that we take the convention that this should be read backwards compared to the way one reads
English text. This is in keeping with the conventional notation for the composition of functions
and our right-to-left multiplication of R matrices. We have used whitespace to divide crossings into
groups of four as these correspond to elementary S and R gates.
Given this construction of the Toffoli gate by braid crossings, it is a simple matter to “compile”
any given logic circuit into a corresponding braid. A5 has 60 elements. Thus, encoding a single
bit into a a pair of A5 elements appears somewhat wasteful. It is natural to try to find Yang-
Baxter solutions acting on d-state dits for smaller d that achieve universal classical computation.
In appendix B, we improve upon the A5-based construction to show that d = 44 suffices. We have
also used exhaustive computer search to find all permutation solutions satisfying the Yang-Baxter
equation up to d = 5 (i.e. up to 25×25 permutation matrices). Our examination of these solutions
suggests that none are computationally universal. Where between 5 and 44 lies the minimal d
remains an interesting open question.
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B Optimizing Classical Braid Gates
In appendix A we have recounted the construction of [34], which shows that the reversible gate R,
which acts on pairs of 60-state dits and satisfies the Yang-Baxter equation, can perform universal
classical computation. In this section, based on a suggestion of Robert Ko¨nig, we show that R
can be modified to obtain a gate acting on pairs of 44-state dits that satisfies the Yang-Baxter
equation and can perform universal classical computation. Our computational evidence suggests
that no reversible gate on d-state dits satisfying the Yang-Baxter equation can perform universal
computation for d ≤ 5. Where between 5 and 44 the minimal d lies for which computationally
universal reversible Yang-Baxter gates acting on d-state qudits exist remains an open question.
The universality construction of [34], recounted in appendix A, starts with all dits initialized to
states from the following set.
S = {g, g−1|g ∈ S0}
S0 = {(14352), (15342), (124), (521), (345), (435)}
Here we show that the orbit of S under the action of the gate R is not all of A5, rather the orbit
has only 44 elements. Thus the restriction of the matrix R onto this 44-dimensional subspace is
a permutation-matrix that satisfies the Yang-Baxter equation and is capable of universal classical
computation.
Recalling (2), one sees that the orbit OR of S under R is
OR = {b−1ab|a ∈ S, b ∈ 〈S〉} (12)
where 〈S〉 is the subgroup of A5 generated by S. A simple computer algebra calculation shows that
〈S〉 = A5, thus OR consists of exactly those elements of A5 conjugate to S.
It is well known that the conjugacy classes of A5 are as follows.
1) the identity (1 element)
2) 3-cycles (20 elements)
3) conjugates of (12)(34) (15 elements)
4) conjugates of (12345) (12 elements)
5) conjugates of (21345) (12 elements)
One sees that OR contains 2), and does not contain 1) or 3). The only remaining question is
whether OR contains both 4) and 5) or just one of them. A simple computer algebra calculation
shows that (14352) and (15342) are non-conjugate elements of A5. Hence OR must contain both
4) and 5). Therefore, |OR| = 44.
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